In this paper, we examine whether the structure of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation package can explain default risk and performance in bank holding companies (BHCs) during the recent credit crisis. Using a sample of 371 BHCs, we show that in 2006 lower holdings of inside debt relative to equity by a CEO has an association with higher default risk and worse performance during the crisis period. We also show that inside debt is a better signal of the BHCs' performance and default risk than inside equity measures. Finally, we provide evidence that supervisors issued favorable ratings to the lead bank in BHCs that paid their CEOs relatively higher inside debt.
I. Introduction
The role of executive compensation as a possible cause of the recent financial crisis has attracted significant attention from the public, policy makers, and researchers. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd Frank Act), which was signed into law on July 21, 2010, requires the regulatory agencies to prohibit the incentive-based compensation practices that encourage inappropriate risk-taking activities at financial institutions.
Two questions have emerged from this attention and the subsequent legislative action. The first question is whether there is a relation between the executive compensation and the excessive risk taking at banks. The second question is whether we can control risk taking by regulating the executive compensation. An extensive body of research examines the first question about the relation between risk taking and the inside equity (stock options and firm equity) holdings of the chief executive officer (CEO). In this paper, rather than focus on the inside equity, we instead study the inside debt (pension benefits and deferred compensation). In particular, we investigate whether the bank holding companies (BHCs) that compensate their CEOs with higher inside debt relative to inside equity, the inside debt ratio, had a lower risk of default and better performance during the most recent financial crisis. Furthermore, we explore whether the inside debt ratio has more power to explain the default risk and the performance in BHCs than the measures based on inside equity.
The core of the debate about the relation between the compensation and risk taking goes back to Jensen and Meckling (1976) , who argued that the CEO's higher level of wealth in the form of inside equity (restricted stock and stock options) aligns the interests of the CEO with the shareholders and causes more risk taking. When the CEO's wealth is in the form of inside debt (pensions and deferred compensation) then the CEO cares more about the long-term solvency of the firm. This concern reduces the CEO's risk appetite. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that in the optimal compensation structure the CEO's inside debt ratio deflated by the firm's debt-to-equity ratio is one. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) later formalized this insight and showed that the risk-shifting problem is mitigated if the CEO is paid partly in inside debt.
The most recent financial crisis provides an opportunity to examine this hypothesized relation between the compensation and either risk taking or the firm's performance. In a recent paper, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) provide evidence that inside equity and the BHCs' performance were negatively related during the crisis. Furthermore, they argue that the CEOs were maximizing shareholder wealth and that the poor performance was merely an unexpected outcome. If the CEOs were focused on shareholder maximization, then their risk-taking activities were not optimal for the other stakeholders of the bank (i.e., the debt holders and the deposit insurer). If the CEOs with a higher inside debt ratio choose investments that have a risk-return profile that is more favorable to the interests of the debt holders and the deposit insurer, then the BHCs that compensate their CEOs with a higher share of inside debt should perform better and face less risk of default during the crisis. 1 Assets at the insured subsidiaries of these companies make up about 72 percent of the assets for all insured depositories in the U.S. at that time. The mean of the inside debt ratio deflated by the BHCs' debt-to-equity ratio in our sample is 0.074, which is substantially below Jensen and Meckling's optimum of one. Wei and Yermack (2010) focus on nonfinancial corporations and find that 29 percent of the CEOs have a relative debt-to-equity ratio that exceeds Jensen and Meckling's optimum. In our sample of BHCs, less than 1 percent of the CEOs have a relative debt-to-equity ratio that exceeds one. Hence, bank CEOs hold significantly more wealth in equity investments compared to CEOs employed in the nonfinancial sector. Relative to nonfinancial firms, the compensation structure of an average BHC creates the incentives for the CEO that are very highly aligned with the BHC's shareholders.
Our multivariate analysis indicates that the CEO's inside debt ratio relative to the BHC's debt-to-equity ratio is a statistically significant predictor of the future default risk of the BHC, after controlling for the characteristics of the BHC and the CEO. We We augment this finding by examining how well the inside debt ratio explains cross-sectional variation in performance measures, such as return on equity, return on assets, and stock returns during the crisis. We find that the BHCs performed significantly better during the crisis if they compensated their CEOs with more inside debt relative to inside equity. This finding together with the finding that the inside debt ratio has an association with a lower risk of default suggests that the inside debt might be a good indicator of the BHC's potential performance. When the BHCs' CEOs have a high share of insider debt as their compensation, then the expected share returns during normal times are lower. Shareholders can view the foregone expected returns as the cost of insuring against losses when times are bad. In times of crisis, the BHCs benefit from the conservative investment decisions that were made during normal times.
Finally, we compare the explanatory power of equity-based compensation measures, such as the CEO's ownership of equity and stock options, with the explanatory power of the inside debt ratio when the dependent variables are proxies for either the default risk or the performance. We show that the equity-based measures have explanatory power, but they lose significance when the inside debt is added to the same regression. This finding implies that the inside debt ratio is a critical signal for the default risk and the performance of the BHC.
In contrast to nonfinancial corporations, banks are different in that their default risk is evaluated by bank supervisors, whose interests are closely aligned with the creditors (depositors). These evaluations in part reflect an ex ante assessment of BHC management quality. We examine the relation between bank supervisory ratings and the CEOs' inside debt and test whether the inside debt is related to higher management quality as perceived by a non-equity stakeholder. We show that there is a significant association between favorable supervisory ratings and the inside debt ratio of the CEO.
This finding is especially interesting because in 2006 examiners were not required to consider components of the CEO's compensation such as inside debt and equity when determining a supervisory rating. Thus, the BHCs whose performance was deemed favorable by the supervisors also happened to be those that had a higher inside debt ratio.
Collectively, our results are consistent with either a signaling interpretation or a causal interpretation. Under a signaling interpretation, bank managers that accept compensation packages with a higher inside debt ratio are less prone to risk taking as an equilibrium outcome of a contracting problem with asymmetric information. In this case, the structure of compensation is a signal for the propensity of managers to take risk, as suggested by John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) . Consistent with this view, we show that we can infer the BHCs' default-risk exposure by looking at the inside debt ratio of the CEO. However, the relation we observe also has a causal interpretation-inside debt causes managers to take less risk that gives support to the Dodd-Frank Act. The precise decomposition of how much of the association is due to a theoretically-predicted signaling effect and a causal effect is left for future work. As Roberts and Whited (forthcoming) point out, such analysis involves instruments or natural experiments drawn from narrower samples or smaller periods of time, which we do not have in this case.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature and outlines the hypothesis. Section III describes the data sources, variables, and the summary statistics. Section IV presents the empirical results from the analysis of the relation between the inside debt and the default risk. Section V examines the relation between the inside debt and the BHC's performance, and Section VI shows whether supervisory ratings reflect better performance for those BHCs that have compensated their CEOs with higher inside debt. Section VII concludes.
II. Literature
There is considerable research that investigates how the structure of CEO compensation is associated with bank risk-taking incentives. Houston and James (1995) investigate the earlier period of 1982 to 1988 and find no evidence that equity-based incentives of CEO's are associated with higher risk, measured by stock price volatility.
However, during this period, the equity incentive compensation was a smaller portion of the compensation package than in later periods. Indeed, Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) and Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) show that the equity and option components of compensation at BHCs increased significantly in the 1992 to 2000 period. Chen, Steiner, and Whyte (2006) examine the relation between option-based compensation and four types of market measures of risk: total, systematic, idiosyncratic and interest-rate risk.
They conclude that the use of stock-option compensation induces risk taking in the banking industry. Mehran and Rosenberg (2008) use data from 1993 to 2002 and find that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock price (delta) and to the volatility of stock returns (vega) are positively related to measures of stock price and asset volatility in the following year. They attribute this relationship to banks undertaking more risky investments.
A growing number of studies investigate the relation between CEO compensation and bank risk taking during the recent financial crisis. A strand of the literature argues that compensation policies contributed to the crisis. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) These papers provide valuable evidence about the relation between CEO compensation and risk taking. However, one common shortcoming in this literature is that they typically use delta and/or vega, which are inside equity based compensation measures. The insight of Jensen and Meckling (1976) provides an opportunity to examine another component of compensation. They hypothesize that there is an optimal ratio of the CEO's inside debt-to-equity ratio deflated by the firm's debt-to-equity ratio.
When this relative measure equals unity the CEO's incentives are equally aligned with shareholders and debt holders, mitigating the incentives to shift risk to debt holders. If the CEO's inside debt ratio is less than the BHC's debt-to-equity ratio, then the CEO has an incentive to redistribute wealth from debt holders to shareholders. In a recent paper, Edmans and Liu (2011) show how inside debt mitigates the incentive to risk-shift.
Unlike the payoff to equity, the payoff to inside debt in a bankruptcy state is positive, which makes the managers more sensitive to the value of the firm when they have more inside debt. This structure aligns the incentives of the managers with debt holders deterring managers from risk-shifting decisions. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Gerakos (2010) are the first to test the Jensen and Meckling (1976) predictions. They use pension benefits as a proxy for inside debt and show that higher levels of CEO pension benefits are associated with lower levels of default risk as indicated by lower distance-to-default and better ratings for non-financial firms. Wei and Yermack (2010) examine the stock and bond market response in nonfinancial firms to disclosure announcements of inside debt in 2006. They find that when the firm discloses that its CEO has a sizable wealth in defined pension plan or deferred compensation there were negative stock and positive bond returns. Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2010) show that a sample of 27 BHCs had on average lower credit default swap (CDS) spreads after the disclosure. Anantharaman, Fang, Gong (2010) find that the cost of debt, both private loans and public debt issues, is higher when the CEO inside debt-toequity ratio relative to the firm leverage ratio is higher.
We follow this literature and investigate how the CEO's inside debt ratio in 2006 is associated with the default risk and performance of BHCs during the crisis period.
III. Data
Our full sample includes 371 institutions. We construct this sample from a number of sources. Our second default risk measure is the distance to default, which we calculate as the market value of assets less adjusted liabilities divided by the asset volatility in dollars.
The estimates for the market value of assets and asset volatility come from Moody's
CreditEdge. For robustness, we also estimate the market value of assets and asset volatility using the Merton (1974) model and obtain similar values for distance to default.
We also use stock return volatility and idiosyncratic stock volatility as proxies for default risk. We define the total stock return volatility as the annualized standard deviation of the monthly log returns over the 2007 to 2008 period. Idiosyncratic volatility is the log of monthly stock returns in excess of the log of monthly returns on the S&P 500, similar to the measure used by Campbell, Malkiel, Lettau, and Xu (2001) . The use of volatility as a proxy for default risk is plausible because both default probability and volatility are positively related to the firm's operational risk (asset volatility) and financial risk (leverage). Furthermore, a firm with a higher standard deviation of equity returns has a higher probability of falling below the default threshold. Consistent with these insights, Campbell and Taksler (2003) report a strong positive relation between corporate bond credit spreads and equity volatility.
The EDF, distance to default and stock return volatilities capture expected default risk. In addition to these default measures, we use actual bank failures over the January 2006 to June 2011 period, during which the lead banks of 34 BHCs failed. Using this as a dependent variable, we examine how well inside debt ratio of the CEO predicts the actual default frequency.
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Performance Measures. We use three measures of bank performance: i) cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR), ii) return on assets (ROA), and iii) return on equity (ROE).
We define the bank's CAR as the annualized cumulative monthly log return in excess of the S&P 500 log return over the 2007 to 2008 period. More specifically, the abnormal return is equal to
where S t represents the bank's stock price and SP500 t represents the level of the S&P500 index in month t. N i is the number of available months over which the average return statistic is calculated.
ROA is defined as the BHC's annualized cumulative quarterly net income over the 2007 to 2008 period divided by the total assets at the end 2006. We define the numerator of ROE in the same way and deflated by total shareholder's equity. In addition, we use interest income, interest expense, provisions for loan losses, non-interest income and expense variables (all as a percent of total assets) to demonstrate the channel through which compensation structure affects ROA.
Inside Debt and Equity. We define the inside debt of the CEO as the sum of the balance in the CEO's pension fund and non-qualified deferred compensation. 5 Pension benefits are reported in proxy filings as the actuarial present value of accumulated benefits determined in accordance with SEC rules. Our measure of pensions includes both qualified plans and non-qualified plans. CEOs typically hold most of their pensions in non-qualified plan. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) guarantees qualified pension plans up to a limit in the case of insolvency of the firm. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that for CEOs most of the pension plan amount is not covered.
Non-qualified deferred compensation is a "Top Hat" plan offered only to employees in the top 10 percent salary bracket. The plan allows the deferral of long-term incentive bonuses into retirement. The BHCs in our sample are subject to bankruptcy rules under which both pension and deferred compensation are treated as unsecured liabilities.
However, in the case of failure, the stand-alone banks in our sample would undergo a bank resolution process and the FDIC would act as the receiver. As the receiver, the FDIC has the authority to disaffirm any contract that it deems burdensome if it will promote the order resolution of the failed bank. 6 Furthermore, the FDIC has the power to prohibit golden parachute payments or indemnification payments to parties that are affiliated with failed banks. Therefore, if the FDIC determines that it is burdensome to pay the CEO the amount of the inside debt that he holds, the FDIC can repudiate the contract. The CEO then has the right to file a claim for actual direct damages and this 5 Qualified pension plans or deferred compensation are considered compensation under the tax code. Nonqualified pension plans or deferred compensation are not considered compensation under the tax code. 6 12 USC 1821 (e) (1) claim would have the same priority as a general trade claimant. This authority was upheld in court.
7 Table 1 shows that 44 percent of the CEOs in our sample hold some deferred (2011) observations that the interests of bank CEOs are highly aligned with shareholder interests.
We define inside equity as the sum of the value of equity holdings and the value of stock options. We calculate the value of equity holdings by multiplying the number of shares held by the stock price at the end of 2006. We construct a value for the stock options by using the detailed data on the option grants, which was first required in the 2006 SEC filings. The maturity, exercise price, and stock price for each of the options holdings are reported in Execucomp and DEF 14A filings. We value the options using the standard Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing formula. We use the one-year constant maturity Treasury bond yield, which was 5.0 percent at the end of 2006, as the risk-free rate. 8 We calculate the six month, one, two, three, five, seven, and ten year volatilities for each stock using monthly returns from CRSP files. Out of this set we pick the volatility over a horizon that is the closest to the stated maturity of the option.
On average, the CEOs in our sample have $41 million in inside equity holdings.
The CEO with the largest amount of inside equity holdings is Charles Schwab who held $4.5 billion in inside equity in 2006. In their sample of non-financial firms, Wei and Yermack (2010) report that on average a CEO holds $28 million of inside equity.
Inside debt ratio and BHC leverage. Our focal independent variable is the CEO's inside debt-to-inside equity ratio deflated by the BHC's debt-to-equity ratio. This ratio provides information about the extent to which the CEO incentives are aligned with both the debt holders and the shareholders of the firm.
We define BHC debt as the total liabilities and BHC equity as the market value of equity as of the end of 2006. On average the BHC debt-to-equity ratio is 5.34. Figure 1 shows the relation between the CEO's inside debt ratio and the debt-to-equity ratio of the BHC. We observe that all but three BHCs in our sample of 371 lie above the 45 degree line. Wei and Yermack (2010) find that 29 percent of industrial firms were above the 45 degree line. Our sample average of the CEO's inside debt ratio to the firm's debt-toequity ratio is 0.074, well below one, which implies that, compared to non-financial firms the incentives of BHC CEOs are more aligned with the interests of the shareholders. This significantly higher than the variation in the BHC's debt-to-equity ratio. 9 As a result most of the variation in the ratio of the two debt-to-equity ratios is driven by the variation in CEO's inside debt ratio rather than the BHC's debt-to-equity ratio. This result is not surprising given that the strict regulatory requirements for bank capital and incentives for profit-seeking decisions impose upper and lower boundaries on bank leverage. In contrast, there are no regulations on the relative proportions of the inside debt and inside equity held by a bank CEO.
The independent variable in our regressions is the natural logarithm of the CEO's debt-to-equity ratio to the firm's debt-to-equity ratio. 10 Throughout the remainder of the study we refer to this variable as relative D/E.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE CEO Characteristics. To control for the CEO's characteristics that could affect his risk aversion and thus the default risk of the BHC, we use the CEO's age and tenure with the BHC. In a cross-sectional regression, age can control for the unobservable characteristics of the CEO including the CEO's risk aversion or confidence. The CEO's tenure has similar characteristics as age but can differ in one important respect. As Sundaram and Yermack (2007) point out, the CEO's pension can mechanically increase based on his years of service to the firm. Therefore, controlling for both the CEO's age and tenure can isolate the impact of relative D/E on risk taking. 9 The coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by mean) of the CEO debt-to-equity ratio is 3.7 and of the BHC debt-to-equity ratio is 0.5. 10 Because the ratio is zero for some CEOs with no inside debt holdings, we add a constant to the ratio to define the logarithm. We set the constant to the average of ratio's minimum (0) and non-zero minimum value over the sample. Our empirical results remain robust to using different constants in the logarithmic transformation.
At the end of 2006, the average age of CEOs in our sample is 57 years and the Citizens BancShares).
In our regressions, we also control for the level of the CEO's pay. When a CEO's total pay exceeds a certain threshold, the CEO may not be responsive to incentive clauses in his contract. Penas and Unal (2003) and Minnick, Unal, and Yang (2011) find evidence that incentive responsiveness decreases as the BHC size, and therefore total pay, increases. We should note that total pay and BHC asset size are highly correlated and care should be taken when testing the effect of either variable on bank risk.
We term the level of the CEO's pay as total compensation, which includes salary, bonus, equity awards, option awards, non-equity incentive compensation, and other compensation. We observe that, on average, the CEOs in our sample received $2. BHC Characteristics. In our regressions, we include size, asset composition, and liability structure to control for BHC characteristics that can influence the default probability. Asset size can capture the too-big-too-fail effects where larger asset size can cause the regulators to be reluctant to close a defaulted bank. In terms of asset characteristics from the end of 2006, we include loan loss reserves, non-performing assets, securities, brokered deposits, and cash and items due from other banks, as a percentage of total assets. The financial information is at the BHC level whenever available (314 BHCs), otherwise we use the financial information of the lead bank (57 banks).
Asset composition and liability structure reflect the credit risk embedded in the balance sheet as the BHC enters into the crisis period. Cole and White (2010) show that these variables exhibit significant explanatory power in predicting the bank failures that Another key BHC characteristic for our analysis is supervisory ratings. Supervisory authorities assign each federally insured bank component-ratings to six aspects of the bank. These are capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk. The ratings are measured on a numerical scale from 1 to 5, where a rating of 1 indicates the strongest performance, risk management practices and lowest degree of supervisory concern, and a rating of 5 is the lowest rating and indicates the weakest performance, inadequate risk management practices and the highest degree of supervisory concern.
Each bank is also assigned a composite rating that reflects an overall strength and stability of the bank. This composite rating is termed the CAMELS rating representing the overall ratings of capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity to market risk components. 11 The sample median of both the composite CAMELS rating and the management or "M" component is 2, which means that the median bank in our sample carries moderate level of risk as assessed by the supervisors.
IV. Empirical Results

A. Multivariate Analysis
Using cross-sectional data, we explore the relationship between BHC default risk and CEO inside debt in the following multivariate setting:
The dependent variable in equation (1) We should note that in equation (1) we estimate the effects of relative D/E on default risk controlling for CEO and BHC characteristics. These characteristics can be viewed as a result of the incentives generated by the CEO compensation package and therefore could be simultaneously determined. However, including the BHC characteristics can isolate the efforts of the CEO during a crisis period. In other words, relative D/E can differentiate the efforts of two CEOs who are endowed with the same amount of business risk but differ only by how their incentives are aligned with the debt holders. Our focal hypothesis is that those CEOs whose incentives are more aligned with the debt holders focus more on mitigating default risk of the BHC. years and obtain similar levels of economic and statistical significance for the relative D/E and the control variables.
The rest of the specifications in Table 2 carry out tests to examine the robustness of this finding when we use alternative risk measures. Specification (3) uses the distanceto-default measure. The coefficient estimate and the statistical significance of the relative D/E in these specifications remain unchanged. In specifications (4) and (5) D/E continues to be a significant variable in these two specifications.
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Finally, for specification (6) we run a probit regression to predict actual bank failures over the 2006 to June 2011 period, during which 34 BHCs in our sample failed.
Here our approach is different than the previous specifications. In (1) through (5) our default risk measures are forward-looking proxies for default probabilities. In specification (6), we capture actual default frequencies. Relative D/E proves to be significant in this specification as well.
Throughout Table 2 , other than relative D/E, the only CEO characteristic that is significant is total compensation. We exclude bank size in our baseline regression model to avoid a multicollinearity problem between size and total compensation. 12 Therefore, the coefficient on total compensation can also reflect the size effect. We address this possibility below when we examine the effect of bank size on our estimates.
The financial characteristics of the BHCs, with the exception of loan loss reserves, are statistically significant at the 5 percent or better levels. We find that the higher levels of non-performing assets are positively associated and cash and securities are negatively associated with the default risk measures. This is plausible because, all else equal, a loan portfolio that has high non-performing loan levels in good times before the crisis is a good indicator of the credit risk in crisis time. On the other hand, cash and securities can provide liquidity during the crisis, therefore reduce default risk.
The results for brokered deposits are particularly interesting. Higher levels of brokered deposits are associated with higher levels of default risk. This finding sheds some light to the policy debate regarding whether use of brokered deposits should be restricted. The rationale here is that use of brokered deposits, which are basically 12 The correlation between CEO Total Compensation and Bank Size on our sample of 371 banks is 0.89.
wholesale deposits obtained from non-core depositors, is an indicator of higher probability of default as discussed in FDIC (2011). Our finding is supportive of this view.
To gauge the economic significance of our results we calculate the standardized regression coefficients, which we define as the change in the EDF that is associated with one standard deviation change in the independent variable. The standardized coefficient of relative D/E in specification (1) is 112 basis points. The standardized coefficient for brokered deposits is 137 basis points, for non-performing assets is 109 basis points and for securities is 100 basis points. All of the other control variables have much lower levels of economic significance.
In Table 2 our focal variable is the relative D/E and we show that this variable is significant in all specifications. However, since this variable is constructed as the log of the ratio of the CEO's inside debt ratio to BHC debt to equity, it is not clear whether the significance is coming from the CEO's inside debt ratio or the firm's D/E ratio.
Furthermore, we have restricted the absolute value of the coefficients on the CEO's inside debt ratio and the firm D/E ratio to be equal. Table 3 , Column 1 shows results when two ratios enter the regression model separately. We observe that both components are significant and we obtain the result that higher levels of the inside debt ratio in 2006
are negatively related to default risk during the crisis. We obtain this result in the presence of leverage ratio showing that the inside debt ratio provides information over and above the leverage ratio to explain default risk.
As indicated above, previous studies mainly focus on compensation variables that use inside equity. Specifically, delta and vega are shown to be related with default risk measures. In Table 3 , columns (2) and (3) confirm the findings of these studies and show that higher stock price sensitivity (delta) and higher sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega) are positively related to default risk.
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In columns (4) and (5) we also include the CEO's inside debt ratio. Interestingly, we observe that with the inclusion of the CEO's inside debt ratio, the delta loses significance and the vega becomes marginally significant. This finding shows that among the compensation variables the inside debt ratio provides better explanatory power for the BHC's default risk.
The supervisory ratings gauge the risk of the institutions. When we include the CAMELS ratings in the model along with the relative D/E as shown in the final column in Table 3 we observe that the relative D/E is still negative and significant. Our results remain robust if we use dummy variables for different categories of CAMELS ratings.
These findings are particularly important because we show that inside debt provides information over and above the supervisory ratings. The CAMELS rating and BHC characteristics are also significant, so the model includes variables that are traditionally used to explain default risk. However, the relative D/E still explains a significant portion of the default risk variation in the presence of these significant variables.
Overall, using different regression models and dependent variables we establish the relative D/E as an important economic variable that is associated with bank default risk. This finding supports the Jensen and Meckling hypothesis that lower levels of inside debt provide incentives to the CEO to align his interests with the shareholders and increase firm risk at the expense of the debt holders. Therefore, in our sample, those CEOs who have higher inside debt ratios have better incentives to balance the interests of shareholders and debt holders. This alignment in incentives results in lower default probability in a crisis environment.
C. Robustness Tests
The previous tests report the significance of the economic relation between default risk and relative D/E using a number of default risk proxies. The robustness tests in this section use various controls to address econometric issues related to the independent and dependent variables in our regressions.
Distribution of Variables.
As Table 1 shows, the distributions of EDF, relative D/E and most control variables exhibit skewness. About 80 percent of BHCs have EDF levels between 0.01 and 3.5 and the remaining institutions have significantly higher levels of default risk (EDF between 3.5 and 35) compared to the rest of the sample.
The first two specifications in Table 4 control for the skewness of the EDF. In specification (1) we run a probit regression after converting the EDF into a binary variable, which is equal to one if the bank is in the top EDF quintile at the end of 2008 and zero otherwise. Specification (2) transforms the EDF into percentile rank form and estimates the OLS regression. 13 In both specifications relative D/E retains its sign and significance.
While the OLS regression assumes an unrestricted range for the dependent variable, EDF is restricted to the [0.01, 35] interval. To mitigate this problem, in specification (3) in Table 4 we use a fractional probit regression to estimate the 13 The transformation of the EDF into percentile rank gives its empirical cumulative distribution function which is between 0 and 1. Papke and and Wooldridge (1996) and use the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator obtained by maximizing the Bernoulli log-likelihood function. Our baseline result remains robust in this specification as well.
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In specification (4) we take the natural logarithm of all variables. In specification (5) we control for outlier effects and estimate the baseline specification where we winsorize all variables at the one percent level (the 0.5 percent level at both tails of the distribution). Finally, specification (6) uses the unadjusted levels of all variables to test whether our results continue to hold without logarithmic transformation and winsorizing.
In all specifications our baseline result remains robust.
Quantile Estimates. Our baseline specification uses the OLS regression that estimates the central tendency of the relation between default risk and inside debt. To examine the robustness of this result for banks with significantly higher and lower amounts of default risk we run quantile regressions. Penas and Unal (2004) show that acquirer credit spreads decline only for those
BHCs that attain too-big-to-fail status as a result of the acquisition. Also, the compensation levels across our sample BHCs are quite different as well. Thus, the incentives of CEO can be influenced by the size of the BHC. Indeed, Minnick, Unal, and
Yang (2011) show that the CEO delta significantly predicts bank acquisition announcement returns for small and medium banks, but not large banks.
We estimate the following model to investigate the effect of bank size on the relation between relative D/E and BHC risk: The coefficient estimates of the interactions between the size dummies and relative D/E explain how each size cohort contributes to the economic relation between relative D/E and EDF. As we note before, the relatively high sample correlation between the size and total compensation variables can lead to multicollinearity in a regression model if both variables are included in the regression. To add the size dummies in our tests without causing multicollinearity we follow Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman (2010) and use size-adjusted residual compensation, defined as the residual of the regression of the log of total compensation on the log of bank total assets.
In Table 6 , specification (1), we define small, medium, and large bank size groups as those BHCs with assets less than $1 billion, between $1 billion and $10 billion, and larger than $10 billion, respectively. The regression result shows that the effect of the relative D/E ratio is negative and significant for all interactions. As further robustness, in specification (2), small, medium, and large bank groups are defined as those BHCs within the bottom, middle, and top terciles based on total assets. We continue to observe that higher inside debt reduces default risk more for large BHCs.
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These results imply that inside debt and bank risk are related in BHCs of all size groups. We further observe that the significance of the coefficient monotonically increases across size groups. These findings show that inside debt is a stronger signal of CEO's risk-taking incentives for larger banks than for smaller banks. They also support the public opinion that the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of large BHCs were among the factors that contributed to the recent financial crisis.
V. Bank Performance and Inside Debt
The findings so far support the argument that those BHCs which had lower default risk in 2008 also had higher inside debt in 2006. It is necessary to examine whether this low risk-taking incentive can also explain financial performance during the crisis period.
To examine this issue, we model the relation between inside debt and bank performance over the 2007 to 2008 period. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 7 display weighted least squares estimates of the relation between the bank's accounting measures of performance, such as ROA and ROE, and the relative D/E of its CEO. Specification (3) uses cumulative abnormal stock returns.
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We observe that in all three specifications the relation between performance variables and relative D/E is positive and significant during the crisis period, which implies that shareholders benefited in a crisis environment from having compensated the CEO with more inside debt during normal times.
In specifications (4) and (5) we replicate the results of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) , who show that delta and vega of CEO compensation before the crisis explain cumulative abnormal returns during the crisis. BHCs that have CEOs with high compensation deltas and vegas had low performance during the crisis. Our results confirm these findings-both delta and vega are negative and significant. However, in specifications (6) and (7) when we add relative D/E to the model delta loses significance and vega keeps its significance, although it is only marginally significant. In unreported results, we estimate the models in specifications (4) to (7) using ROA and ROE and the dependent variable. In these regressions results are qualitatively the same but we find, in contrast to the Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), delta and vega are not significant. Upon further investigation, we find that the difference arises because Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) use the levels of delta and vega and we use the natural logarithm of these variables. Our results are qualitatively the same when ROA and ROE are the dependent variables. However, as shown on Table 1 , delta and vega are highly skewed so it is important we use the natural logarithm of the delta and vega.
Overall, these results show an important feature of inside debt. Shareholders may obtain lower short-run returns during normal times when the CEO is compensated with a lower relative D/E because such compensation structure is associated with less risk taking. However, this reduction of returns in good times can be viewed as an insurance cost that provides protection during times of heightened risk. In an environment when the default risk in the economy rises and the financial institutions have a common adverse system-wide shock, shareholders benefit from the CEO's prior conservative investment decisions. Table 8 
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As column (6) of Table 8 shows, if a CEO has a higher relative D/E in 2006, the net income as a percent of assets is higher in the subsequent two years. In columns (1) to (5) we look at some of the components of net income and find that the increase in net income is due to lower interest expenses, lower provisions, and higher non-interest income.
We can interpret these results as follows. If the CEO has a higher relative D/E they have less incentive to take on risk because their incentives are also aligned with debt holders. Market participants understand this incentive structure and, controlling for losses on the credit portfolio, they require lower rates from the firm run by a CEO that has his incentives more aligned with debt holders, which results in lower interest expense. Hence, this finding is consistent with the argument that compensation structure can serve as a signal for risk-taking incentives (John, Saunders, and Senbet, 2000) .
Furthermore, the risk-mitigation incentives result in loan portfolios with fewer delinquencies and hence supervisors require lower loan loss provisions. Finally, if the compensation structure encourages the CEO to make decisions that are conservative from a risk-taking perspective, then it can be more difficult to achieve earnings targets. In that case, fee-based activities, such as wealth management or trust activities, which result in higher non-interest income, become the safer, but more difficult, avenue to offset the forgone expected earnings.
VI. Supervisory Ratings and Relative D/E
The empirical evidence thus far demonstrates that the relative D/E is associated with the default risk and the performance of the BHC. Specifically, we show that it is strongly predictive of the BHC default probabilities. In this section, we investigate whether the relative D/E is associated with supervisory ratings. Such an experiment is unique to the banking industry because the deposit insurance fund is exposed to default risk and bank supervisors issue ratings that gauge the overall health and stability of the institution (CAMELS ratings). As discussed above, examiners assign a composite CAMELS rating for the overall health of the institution and a rating for each component-capital, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity and interest rate sensitivity. Thus, we can assess whether an institution that receives a favorable rating also has a higher CEO relative D/E. The management, or "M", component is particularly interesting for our purposes because it represents the supervisory assessment of the quality of the board of directors and the management of the bank. When supervisors assign this rating they consider factors such as the quality of oversight, management's response to risks, the quality of the risk management systems, the adequacy of audits and internal controls and policies, the depth and succession of management, the concentration of authority, the avoidance of self dealing and the reasonableness of compensation policies. 14 It is important to note that the bank examination guidelines in existence in 2006 did not require the examiner to consider the CEO's inside debt or equity holdings when issuing a rating. Therefore, we expect no mechanical relation between relative D/E and supervisory ratings. These ratings assess the riskiness of the financial and investment decisions made by the bank executives as perceived by the supervisors. If relative D/E is indeed associated with bank default risk we expect to see significant cross sectional correlation between relative D/E and supervisory ratings. We obtain the CAMELS ratings of the largest bank in a BHC and investigate its relation to relative D/E of the CEO. Table 9 shows the results. After controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, bank size, and compensation we observe in various specifications that higher CAMELS and M ratings are associated with those institutions that have lower relative D/E. This finding shows that supervisors issued favorable ratings to the lead bank in BHCs that paid their CEOs relatively higher inside debt.
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These results combined with our findings in Table 3 that the CEO inside debt ratio has the power to explain BHC default risk over and above the CAMELS rating have important policy implications. Supervisors can evaluate management's compensation structure to assess incentives for risk taking. In particular, the CEO's inside debt ratio promises to be a significant indicator of how well management's incentives are aligned with debt holders.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a sample of 371 BHCs to examine whether the ratio of inside debt to inside equity held by the CEO can explain their default risk and performance during the crisis. In our sample, the average BHC debt-to-equity ratio is 5.34. The inside debt to inside equity ratio is nowhere close to this ratio. The average level of inside debt compensation for CEOs is $3 million and the average inside equity is $41 million. Such a bias toward inside equity compensation implies that the interests of a CEO are strongly aligned with those of the shareholders. However, our results demonstrate that BHCs faced lower default risks during the crisis if their CEOs held more inside debt relative to inside equity and thus had incentives that were more aligned with the debt holders. In addition, BHCs performed better during the crisis when the CEOs had a higher inside debt ratio that indicates shareholders can also benefit when they make the incentives of the CEOs align with those of the debt holders.
We analyze the relative power of inside debt and inside equity (delta and vega) compensation measures to explain the subsequent default risk and the performance of BHCs. We show that the inside equity-based measures have explanatory power, but lose significance when the inside debt ratio is added to the same regression. Finally, we obtain banking industry-specific verification that the inside debt ratio is indeed related to lower risk taking and better performance. We show that the relative D/E of the CEO is significantly related to the CAMELS ratings (and specifically to management ratings) issued by the bank examiners. Given that these ratings do not consider the management compensation structure, we take this observation as additional evidence that the inside debt aligns the interests of the management and the debt holders.
These findings imply that there is an important role for the inside debt ratio as a signal of the risk-taking incentives of the banks' executives. BHCs' stakeholders can use this information to identify banks where the compensation structure provides the CEO with incentives that are aligned more with the debt holders and therefore inclined towards less risk taking, or more aligned with the shareholders and therefore inclined towards more risk taking. The absolute value of the t-statistic is in parentheses. *=p<0.10, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01. Specifications (1)- (4) are estimated with OLS with robust standard errors. Specifications (5)- (6) are estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) where the weights are equal to the number of observations used to calculate the volatility estimates. MVA/TA is measured as a percent. Loan Loss Reserves, Non-Performing Assets, Securities, Brokered Deposits and Cash are all measured as a percent of Total Assets. 
Table 4 Robustness Tests
The absolute value of the t-statistics is in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 In column (1) (4) both the dependent and the all of the independent variables are expressed in natural logarithms. In column (5), the specification is the same as the baseline specification but all variables are winsorized at the one percent level (0.50 percent level at both tails of the distribution). In column (6), all of the variables are expresed in levels.
(1) (2) (3) The absolute value of the t-statistics is in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 All specifications are estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) where the weights are the number of observations that are used to calculate the performance measures. The cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) is the sum of monthly log stock return in excess of the S&P log return. ROA and ROE are measured as a percent of total assets and are annualized quarterly averages over 2006Q4 to 2008Q4. (1) 
Table 8 Performance Tests
The absolute value of the t-statistics is in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variables are measured as a percent of total assets and is an annualized quarterly average over 2006Q4 to 2008Q4. All specifications are estimated using weighted least squares (WLS) where the weights are the number of observations that are used to calculate the performance measures.
(1) Table 9 Relative D/E and CAMELS Ratings The absolute value of the t-statistics is in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Specification (5) uses the winsorized version of the independent variables. 
